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OUR RENAISSANCE—ITS MEANING, AIM, AND METHOD¹

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I am to speak to you on a great subject tonight, and one that does not require a long introduction. But I am sure that it is only fitting that I should say one preliminary word, an expression of my gratitude to those who asked me to address you on such an occasion as the present meeting. This is my first visit to America, and I have come in a representative capacity. A section of the British Association with which I am co-operating felt that your methods of classical teaching are in certain respects superior to those in use in Great Britain, and I am come to be able to report on those methods. Hence my proper function tonight would appear to be to see rather than be seen—to listen rather than be listened to; but when your Classical Association complimented me by offering to listen to my ideas as to the aims and methods of that classical renaissance in which your organization is taking a leading part in America, I felt that the honor was one which it would be ungracious for me to decline.

It is impossible for those who are concerned in our renaissance to forget that the great revival of classical learning a few centuries ago was not only the commencement of all modern history, but that it has a very particular interest for your nation. Undoubtedly the discovery of America was the direct outcome of that wonderful stirring of men's minds and hearts which closed the old era and heralded the new. Nor will you who are involved in the effort to revivify the classical learning in the twentieth century object to my comparing that effort, modest though it may be, relatively speaking, with the Renaissance of the fifteenth century. The aim of those great humanists was no doubt a great one, but we claim

¹Read before the twelfth annual meeting of the Classical Association of the Middle West and South.

to have one identically similar. They called themselves humanists just because they wanted to benefit humanity as a whole and not in any sectional degree. We too believe, and we try to convince others, that the restoration of classical study on rational lines would be a real boon to human education all along the line and a real contribution to the most vital welfare of human society. They were certainly enthusiasts—we are nothing if not that. They founded academies to promote their cause in the great centers of Italian, and later of north European, culture; we have founded classical associations all over the world—in England 10, in Scotland, Wales, and Ireland 3, in America 4, in Australia 3, in India 1. They aroused opposition, they were decried and sometimes misunderstood; we ourselves—well, it is the fate of all good people, is it not? Above all they came to stay; I am not going to say where we shall be in five hundred years time, but I will say this—we are not going to be got rid of very easily, and I hope we shall give a fairly good account of our stewardship.

There are, however, two points of contrast which I should like to indicate between the position of the great humanists and our own. It was very clearly pointed out by the late Sir Richard Jebb of Oxford that the revival of learning owed very little to the universities; on the contrary, it was viewed with great suspicion by the universities which were naturally impregnated with mediaeval ideas. Now on the whole, even though there may have been some exceptions here and there, the universities have done very well by our movement and have generally extended a generous sympathy and encouragement to the work of the classical associations. Again, the Renaissance, at least in its earlier stages, was distinctly an aristocratic movement. Our movement, on the contrary, appeals directly to the mass of the people. We are trying to democratize classical study; we strain our efforts to bring home to the ordinary men and women of today the conviction that they must by no means allow the ancient learning to be crowded out in the educational struggle for existence, unless they would deprive themselves and their children of a precious inheritance. We tell them that without a knowledge of the earlier phases of history and letters, all their mental culture would become sickly and anemic, that the

very soul of humanity would be wounded and enfeebled, and that not merely in their academic life, but in their social and civic relationships, men would be poorer and the standards of their loyal service would be lowered through daring to despise the record of the past.

In the remarks which I shall offer in illustration of this thesis I shall take it for granted that you as members of an almost national classical association believe with me that no mental discipline can be better than that which aims at producing an understanding of, and a reasonable sympathy with, classical life and more particularly Hellenism. But let this attitude of ours be clearly understood. We do not by any means contend that the Greeks were free from faults in their character, in their domestic life, or above all in their politics. We may learn a great deal from their deficiencies and it is no part of our thesis that any nation has ever been or indeed can be perfect. What we maintain is that from any human standpoint the Greeks were incomparably the greatest people the world has ever known, and that they were so on account of their ideals, or rather because they knew how to translate their ideals into reality. What is true of a man is true of a nation. A dreamer is no good. The Greeks were not dreamers, they were practical people. That is my thesis, to put it as short as I can. And now I will try to prove it.

In the domain of art and literature, which has a great influence upon idealism, nobody doubts that the Greeks were supreme. But I believe that the champions of Hellenism do wrong to it by harping so much on one side of the question that they forget to insist on other aspects which are quite as important. It is all very well to insist on the excellence of Greek poetry and Greek drama, and on the importance of Greek sculpture in the history of high art; but in saying this let us never forget the greatness of Greece in quite other realms. What I may call the more human and even material side of Greek achievement ought not to be overlooked.

Poetry of course is a great thing, but only in so far as it is a genuine index of the human spirit in its finest aspiration. If we are to divorce it from all that it rightly and necessarily implies, if we are to regard it as a sort of graceful recreation or exotic bloom

of beauty, then I hold it a very doubtful proposition that this would be the best mental pabulum with which our youth could possibly be provided. Aristotle classes poets with lunatics—at least they are often dreamers, and dreamers many people hold in abomination. But the great poets of the world, the Homers, and the Vergils and the Dantes, were not dreamers—they were very strenuous persons, and they left the world a deal richer and better than they found it. When human nature is raised to its highest power by patriotism, holy ambition, love, or religion, then the voice of the poet will make itself heard; emotions thrive by expression, and hence the true educationist, who is a vital person, knows that poetry has value in promoting the vital activities of the human soul.

I have said this because I want you clearly to understand that if I take your thoughts away from the more aesthetic side of the classical revival tonight it is not because I undervalue Greek art and Greek and Roman poetry. But it is my belief that as long as we emphasize what is more or less obvious, namely, the supremacy of the Greek mind in the world of art and literature, we may easily lose our bearings. The questions which I shall raise are broader and more vital than any question of mere artistic excellence.

Let us now turn to the subject of Greek politics. At first sight they appear to have been rather futile. If for instance we compare the external history of Greece with that of Rome, we are at once struck by a strong and painful contrast. By the might of their hands the Romans built up a large and lasting empire which beyond question civilized Europe and contributed to the progress of the human race. And what picture does Greek history present? Chiefly a weltering mass of ineffectual and incohesive city-states without unity of aim or any very important achievements in the political order. To say that the civilization spread by Rome was mainly Greek in its character is to enunciate a fact, and of course it is an important fact, but one not exactly to the point. The intellect of Greece undoubtedly conquered Rome and that just at the time when Rome became the great world-power; but we are speaking now, not of the triumphs of the intellect, but of political efficiency. Human progress demands intellect also, but it is mainly a matter of strength—of strength practically applied and wisely

utilized for the betterment of human society. Let us therefore recall what Greece effected for mankind in the days of her strength, not in the way of the spirit only, but also in the external order of warfare, commerce, and state administration. It must be granted that owing partly to temperamental and climatic conditions Greece was never properly unified, nor was her strength fully turned to account by the practical methods which imperial Rome employed. What I have to insist upon is that this very contrast may cause us to forget or to underestimate the genuine military and political record of the Hellenic people.

Before going into the details of Greek history we might ask why it is so conspicuous for the absence of national unity and of political concentration of energy? This was due to the existence of the city-state. Every true Hellene was proud to belong to a sovereign city and to have a direct and personal share of its government—a share which might vary indeed in the different constitutions, but which was always the one thing that marked off the free citizen from the slave or the metic. This love of freedom and of citizenship was a passion with the Greeks; when they called foreigners *barbaroi* they meant first and foremost that they were not free citizens. To trace this idea down through the ages, to show how the democratic principles which we cherish are a very direct inheritance from our Hellenic forerunners, would be an interesting task, but perhaps a trifle obvious. This tendency of the Greek mind has been so often referred to that we may, I think, take it for granted tonight. I merely wish to repeat that if the Greeks rendered a service to humanity (and especially I might add to America) by their love of civic freedom, which meant what we call municipal as distinct from national politics, it is easy for us to understand how for them imperialism or even nationality in the fullest sense was sadly undeveloped. The Athenian Empire was perhaps the least galling of the different hegemonies which we know sprang up at various periods of history upon Greek soil. It was also perhaps the best effort made toward realizing Greek national unity, and yet we know how it failed. Every city that belonged to it in its later and more developed form felt gravely humiliated by the very fact of being included in the Athenian Empire and every individual owning

allegiance to a subject city felt something was wanting to his dignity as a Hellene.

Such was democratic feeling among the Greeks, a blessed heirloom for ages yet unborn, and a great force, as events proved, even in war, but one that carried with it many drawbacks for the external efficiency of the Hellenic race. If then I can prove, as I intend to, that in spite of such serious drawbacks Greek policy was by no means as abortive of permanent results as one could easily conclude, I shall consider that their title to our admiration and gratitude becomes clearer to us by reason of the difficulties which they encountered.

I need not speak of Marathon, Thermopylae, and Salamis. You will take for granted that at least for a moment the Greeks did put up a splendid fight in their struggle with the Persian invader. But when we look at the final result of these great victories we are undoubtedly disappointed to find that within a century Persia is again exercising a kind of predominant influence over the Greeks, somewhat subtle, perhaps, but practically so like her former overlordship as hardly to be worth distinguishing from it. Again when Alexander invades Persia in return and overruns the Eastern Empire like a human tornado, we find that after less than a generation his dreams have been to a large extent frustrated, and the work he accomplished is undone. You might urge this point and say, Of course the Greeks were brilliant fighters, for they were brilliant at everything, but did they know how to press home their victory, did they achieve any permanent results? For we have a right to inquire about any national policy what Mrs. Siddons asked the shopman about his fabric when she struck her stage attitude and shouted to him in tragedy tones, "Young man, but will this wash?"

I would submit then that there is another side to the story of Greek warfare and statesmanship. Let us take a broader outlook. What is the greatest outstanding feature in the history of Europe and indeed of the whole world? It is what is often called the eternal question, the ever-abiding struggle for supremacy between East and West. The Orient was first in the field, it put up a great fight when challenged, it has never been quite defeated, we cannot say today that it ever will be. I need not particularize. I prefer

not to speak of current events, of the Pacific, of those Semite influences which are so potent in our midst.

But I say this. On the whole we of the West have had the best of the struggle, and for this we have first and foremost to thank the Greeks. No one who fails to see this has read Greek history to any purpose. He has failed to see the forest for the leaves. Besides, I am sure that students of Greek history suffer from allowing themselves to be so much dazzled by the movements of extreme brilliancy that they comparatively neglect whole periods, which though less noteworthy from the standpoint of literature and art yet demand our serious attention. *Erant fortes ante Agamemnona*, and long before the days of Marathon the Greeks had done mighty acts of valor. One advantage accruing to the archaeological discoveries of our times is that the attention of Greek scholars has been riveted on the beginnings of Hellenism, and we are now for the first time able to speak with relative confidence of the earlier periods of Greek social and political life. We are in a position to realize better than formerly the conditions which prevailed in Europe when after a period of confusion known as the Dark Age the Greek race first began to rise from obscurity and to have a consciousness of its own nationhood. We know that after the break-up of Minoan civilization in the thirteenth and twelfth centuries before Christ, the men of Canaan or Phoenicia were for a time supreme in the waterways of the West. With their galleys built from the pines and cedars of the Lebanon they swept the seas, carried on their world-wide commerce in dye-stuffs, glass, ivories, gems and metal work, spices and perfumes, and all the products of the Near and Far East, spread the use of arithmetic and alphabetic writing among the people of the coast and thus kept alive the torch of humanism. This was the heyday of the Orient in the West, and it was owing to the activity and enterprise of the Ionic Greeks that these Phoenician merchants soon lost the supremacy of the Mediterranean. We need not deny that Europe was indebted to these Asiatic sealords for much that is valuable in its civilization, yet after all we are Westerners—you are Westerners even though you belong only to the Association of the Middle-West. You will not, I take it, anyhow, regret that the destinies of the human race were

not left to the hands of Phoenicians to be finally disposed of. We have almost no monumental or literary records of the period. Homer had passed away; in the *Odyssey* no doubt we get a glimpse of the beginnings of Ionian wanderings in search of new fields of activity. But at the dawn of Greek history, at the beginning of the eighth century, we find the Ionians had already pushed their way into the Euxine, had seized its gates—the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus—and had begun to plant in those parts colonies which rapidly rose to positions of importance. In the West, Cumae, far up the western coast of Italy, had been already founded and not later than 700 B.C. (according to the newest chronology based on recent examination of pottery) the Greek cities of Sicily, including Syracuse, had begun to flourish. At this date, therefore, clearly the Phoenicians must have been driven away from Greek waters to the West, where they founded the new empire which afterward fought with Rome so valiantly for the hegemony of Europe and the world.

Our knowledge, then, of the struggle which ended in the victory of the Ionian Greeks over the Orient is extremely limited. All we can say of it is that it must have been a bitter struggle extending over many centuries, and that when we count Greek history as commencing, this wonderful people had already shown their grit and had tasted the delights of hard-won victory.

Next after this period of struggle for the command of the sea and long before what is generally considered the classical period (I mean of course the days of Miltiades and Pericles), came the age of tyrants, a period to which justice has not always been done by historians. The reason for this no doubt is that the Greeks themselves after they had reached the full stature of their liberty and democratic power naturally looked back with disdain upon a period when Greeks like Orientals owned allegiance to a master. Despots, in any complete sense of the word, the tyrants were not; yet the later Greeks were ashamed of the very name, which probably is not a Hellenic word, and certainly was something uncongenial to Hellenic temperament. Yet the age of tyrants was a great age—it has even been maintained that it was the greatest age of the Greeks. At least Freeman, who was a supreme authority on classi-

cal history, and was strongly devoted to Hellenism and not disposed to write paradoxes, has gone so far as to maintain that when the Greeks had to defend themselves against foreign invasion, it was a sign that their real power was beginning to wane, and that the day of their greatest military glory was already overpast before the era of the Persian Wars.

I shall not argue this point further, but I will content myself with stating that we are wrong if we regard the success of the Greeks in the Persian Wars in the light of a startling episode of the history of Europe. I would submit that it was nothing of the sort; it was the climax of a long period of conquest, and it was most assuredly a beginning of new and significant exploits. It is true that the Greeks allowed it to appear in the immediate sequel that Persia held the winning hand, though she did not. This was folly if you will, and truly it shows up all the weakness of Greek political effort. I am not defending the foreign policy of the Greeks, but only the essential virility of their nature, which is a different thing and quite consistent with bad imperialism.

Something similar has to be asserted of the later periods of Greek history. The success of Alexander may easily be misunderstood. I need not argue the point that though Alexander was not a pure Greek, his triumphs were the triumphs of Hellenism quite as truly as the victories of Napoleon were French victories. For Napoleon was not a Frenchman in any full sense and yet he led Frenchmen to battle and was entirely absorbed in a French enterprise. All serious students of Greek history know what is not quite on the surface, namely, that Alexander's conquest of the East was the direct result of previous Greek warfare, and in particular of victories gained by Greek troops led by Cyrus over the armies of the Orient about 70 years before Alexander reigned in Macedon. If we study history superficially, we are likely to be struck by isolated events, especially if they are of the nature of a cataclysm. But the deeper currents of human life, the real causes which lead up to surprising results, are not so readily discerned; and it seems to me that this is very true of the warfare waged by Greek arms against the powers with which during her career she came into conflict—whether Phoenicians, Persians, Egyptians,

Thracians or other barbarians by whom she was surrounded, including later on the Gauls who were overcome by Macedon and Pergamum. The truth seems to me to be that this warfare was searching and continuous, and that, in spite of the heavy handicap that her warfare on the whole was badly organized, she came out victorious. In spite of her incurable disunion, a fault which her enemies knew only too well how to take advantage of, somehow she managed to keep her end up. Through the centuries she was often depressed. Miletus fell. Athens fell twice. Sicily was hard pressed by her own tyrants. Macedon faltered. Pyrrhus was conquered. Corinth was finally wiped out. But in spite of it all Greece did her work, and all things considered she did not do it badly.

One more word before I leave the question of Greek external policy to consider quite a different aspect of my subject. In speaking about Greek history I have treated it as isolated and even in a sense as contrasted with Roman history. Now that is precisely not the way in which I conceive that the subject should be practically dealt with. It is really when we combine the study of democratic Greece with that of imperial Rome, and only then, that we provide a perfect historical discipline for our youth. I am not now referring to the spiritual debt of Rome to Greece, to the fact that Roman civilization all along the line was almost pure and undiluted Hellenism. I do not wish to mix matters. I am talking of politics, or civics, if you will, and not of things of the intellect or the spirit. If we consider the history of Greece and Rome side by side, as of course we do in classical education, the very contrast they present to the student's mind appears to be of extreme utility. We see on the one hand the great success of a huge imperial system clouded by many defects, many sins, much suffering, and frequent local failures. The fact that the Greeks also had their sins and their failures, though they proceeded from quite distinct, and often from opposite causes is equally illuminating. We may at least learn the lesson of the golden mean and we may also learn the principle which we can never learn too often—*humanum est errare*. Human life consists of failures as well as successes, and the road to success as often as not is through failures. We "sow in tears to reap in joy."

But once more, the debt that Rome owed to Greece, even in a military sense, was immense; this fact too may be easily obscured and forgotten. Except in the extreme West, except in the case of Gaul, Spain, and Britain, the Roman Empire was the direct heir of the great empires carved out of Alexander's conquests, Syria, Egypt, Pergamum, to say nothing of Macedon herself. The Diadochi were really great men; as imperialists they bear comparison with any of the great Romans except perhaps Caesar and Trajan, who alone could be equated with Alexander himself. The Hellenistic period is now slowly coming into its own, its significance is being gradually grasped. We may hold that, comparatively speaking, the period of the struggle between Greece and Rome was also a period of Greek political decadence. But if this is so, what then are we to say of the really great days of the Greeks, before Rome had yet come upon the scene? I have dealt with this aspect of Greek history because it can be so easily passed over. I know that it is so because of my own experience in regard to mental results acquired from the Greek studies to which I have devoted many years of my life. I feel that it was at a late period of my progress that I came fully to grasp what I now realize to be the true position of Greece in the external history of Europe.

After this very brief and inadequate outline of the educational bearings of Greek history as I conceive them, we must now proceed to quite a different aspect of the revival of Hellenic studies. I have referred to my own experience, and I shall now ask you to let me speak of what is even more intimately personal than this reading of Greek history: I refer to the subject of religion. Seriously to introduce this topic before a secular association is, I know, to approach a delicate question. Yet I have confidence in an American audience. There is something reassuring in the very atmosphere breathed in this land of liberty. And if I speak to you frankly and fearlessly of the most sacred interests of human life, I know that you will give me a fair and perhaps even a sympathetic hearing. I stand before you, it is true, confessed as a member of the clerical profession, but I trust that you will find that my remarks transcend all danger or suspicion of clerical bias.

Among, then, ordinarily thoughtful persons there is, we must sorrowfully admit, a great gulf fixed by reason of our religious predispositions and antipathies. But we ought to be conscious that underlying all our theological differences, many of us own much that is common. Whether Catholics or Protestants, agnostics, or even some of those who are called atheists, we hold in common certain fundamental convictions. We all believe, do we not, in some sort of ideal goodness, in the ultimate triumph of right, in the power that everyone has of doing his bit, be it great or small, to promote the cause of goodness in the world? You will not misunderstand my drift nor apprehend that I am hinting that our theological creeds are unimportant things. I of course hold them to be most vitally important; but just because of that, I hold also that those truths which underlie theological belief are the most important of all—because without a strong conviction of fundamental religion, all theology must be formal, prefatory, and sterile.

And the reason why I wish to put this matter in a personal light is because in regard to religious matters every man has an undoubted right to speak for himself, but no one can properly speak for another.

My own experience then is this. As far as I can tell, any religion that I have been able to attain to, any religion in the deepest sense of the word, has been very largely influenced by my Greek studies. I don't say exclusively. I don't speak of supernatural grace. I don't refer to the most cogent arguments of a metaphysical sort. It is merely a psychological fact that I would record. In those dark hours which, I take it, all souls, Christian and pagan, have to experience, those hours of wrestling with doubt, with misgiving, with spiritual despondency, I have found no human document which has influenced me so poignantly as certain pages of Plato and, in particular, his description of the death of his great master which he has left us in the *Phaedo*. I can only name one Christian book (outside the canon of inspiration), whose *human* appeal can compete with that of Plato. I mean the *Confessions* of St. Augustine. But then the Bishop of Hippo was himself a close student of Plato; I do not say merely that he is tinged with Platonic feeling, I would rather describe him as a pure exponent of Platonism, of course run into

a Christian mold. And in fact he makes it clear that he owed his conversion to Christianity to his studies of Platonic philosophy.

Notice, however, that my attitude is not concerned with Plato's philosophy viewed as a speculation of the intellect. It is true that he exhausts all his force and ingenuity to prove the existence of a future life where a just Providence will reward virtue and punish the sinner; but it is also true that his arguments fail most palpably and even miserably. No, it is the potent influence of Plato's personality, his human insight, his love of truth, his reverence, his deep religious sense, which gains on the reader till he succumbs to the almost hypnotic influence of the man himself. People talk about Greek intellectuality as though that would explain the spell which the Greeks have cast over all the ages of the world. Their intellect was great, because they were great all around; and a man's intellect is no small part of him, but it is not by any means the whole. No man ever ruled his fellow-men by dominating their intellects. Plato can touch the heart: that is the secret of his strange influence. The curious thing is that Plato's mind has ruled the world's thinkers perhaps more than any other philosopher, and yet his philosophy as a system is very far to seek. It is not even quite intelligible. In this he stands in the strongest contrast to Aristotle, the Stagirite, whose thought is as clear, moderate, and systematic as it is wholly untinged by the emotion of his Athenian master.

Taking this pair of Greek philosophers together, what a glorious combination they make! Both of them are giants, both without a rival in his own sphere. Aristotle, too, did much for the philosophy of religion, for upon his thought is based the philosophy of the Christian church; but his intellect was perhaps too cold and undisturbed by emotion for him to produce in the hearts of men the response which Plato has evoked down the ages almost without interruption. Like his followers of his own Academy, we are still content to sit beneath Plato's feet, to gaze, to wonder, and to pray.

I say nothing about Greek philosophy as a whole, because mere human philosophy in its most formal sense is perhaps the one thing we could best do without. I pass over the fact that undoubtedly the Greeks did create philosophy and that the very word suggests

the fact. I prefer to take my stand upon the appeal made by Greek studies to the heart. I maintain that if indeed they can do something toward deepening in our hearts the very springs of sane religious feeling, surely this is a strong reason for hesitating to clear them out of the way in modern education. There is not too much real religion in the world, though undoubtedly there is often too much talk about it.

How far we seem to have wandered now from the question we were discussing about Alexander's conquests and the imperialism of the Athenian state! Yet to my mind the question of religion is nearer to war and statesmanship than it is to the aesthetic spirit, or the conscious persistent quest of types of beauty in nature and in art.

Here I am stating what I know is controversial. Perhaps many of you think there is or should be a clear connection between art and religion, between aestheticism and the religious spirit. These are difficult questions, and no one ought to be over-dogmatic in dealing with them. But as this question has arisen in our treatment of Hellenism, I may be allowed to express my own conviction as to the relation between religion and art. It is this. There have been undoubtedly some happy moments in the history of art when it went hand in hand with religion, but taking its history as a whole, and particularly looking at the art of the Renaissance and of our own modern life, I should say that the interests of art and of religion are by no means generally sympathetic. Religion inclines toward symbolism, and symbolism is frequently uncongenial to high art.

I thought it right to touch on this point, but it is really a side issue. Whether art and literature ordinarily promote religion or not, it is quite certain that they need not necessarily do so. My thesis is that one important aspect of Hellenism was its religious spirit. I am out against the one-sided and very injurious belief that when you have called the Greeks an aesthetic people you have said all that need be said about them.

In an address like this, in which one deals with a large and comprehensive subject, it is hardly possible to treat exhaustively the topics which come crowding into one's thoughts. My aim tonight

has been to suggest lines of thought which might prove fruitful, to point to aspects of the classical revival which may be obscure and which are in danger of neglect. One thing must strike any thoughtful investigator in the highways and byways of Hellenic life and thought, and that is the extraordinary complexity of Greek nature—which I suppose may be partly accounted for by its rich endowments.

If, having grasped the significance of Greek life and Greek achievement in its totality, you then turn to consider Greek art and poetry, you will be able to estimate it at its true value. You will say that Greece was bound to produce high art. You will have no temptation to undervalue it, but you will certainly place it in its true perspective. Because Greek nature was glorious, because Greek life was full, varied, and complete, because Greek emotion was stirred to strive for the best, therefore Greek hands could build a Parthenon, Greek voices could chant sweetly Pindar's songs of victory or Sophocles' Ode to Colonus, or Euripides' invocation of the god of love.

But let us be fair even to the Greeks. Do not call them a nation of poets and sculptors and dramatists. Sinners they may have been, but do not brand them as aesthetic. Plutarch says of Pericles that he alone left a sting in their ear when he addressed an Athenian audience. But Pericles did more than make speeches to the mob of Athens.

Before concluding I have still a suggestion to make, and here I will address myself not so much to those who as members of a classical association are interested in preserving the ancient culture, but rather to those who are eager to drive Greek studies away as something antiquated and useless to the citizens of a modern state.

Now what is the discipline which the enemies of classical training propose to offer us as its substitute? It is generally what is known as scientific education. It is of course taken for granted that the advocates of Latin and Greek studies are opposed to the teaching of science. This, however, would be (at least I speak for myself) a most untrue allegation. Our renaissance, if it means anything, means the revival of humanism, and science properly understood is in a high sense a very important part of humanism.

It is quite true that we do not all approve of modern scientists and of their aims and methods, but we by no means disapprove of the teaching of science in its proper way and in its proper place. And this is a point to be strongly insisted upon.

We should be very poor Hellenists if we did not glory in the fact that modern science quite as much as philosophy, poetry, and art was a gift from Greece to humanity. It is only one of their gifts—many Hellenists consider it is the greatest—but it is unnecessary for us to discuss that question. What I want to do is to give you an outline (and it must be very imperfect in the short space that remains at my command) of the debt which the world is under in this respect to the intellect, the perseverance, and the practical wisdom of the Greeks. I shall touch upon mathematics and astronomy as representing theoretic science, and upon medicine as representing practical or applied science in one of its most necessary aspects.

And what is very important for us to observe in this connection is not merely the marvelous degree of scientific knowledge attained to by the Greeks; but the much more important fact that at the time when modern science took its rise at the Revival of Learning, it was owing to the rediscovery of Roman and Greek scientific writings and the recovery of the threads of ancient research which had been lost sight of during mediaeval times, that the great pioneers of modern discovery were enabled to do their work. Nay more, we shall not understand the very essence of the humanistic movement if we do not realize that the revival of letters was viewed by many of the promoters much more as a means than as an end. That is, while many were engaged in the quest of literature for its own sake, many others were seeking above all to disinter the scientific treatises of Roman but much more of Greek authors. Professor John Burnet has written excellently on this subject, and as instances of the demand for scientific books he has pointed out that as early as 1482 Euclid's *Geometry* was printed in Latin, and in Greek in 1533, whereas the works of Hippocrates on medical science appeared in 1525 in Latin, and in the Greek original in the year following.

In modern astronomical research the epoch-making event was of course the announcement by Copernicus of the system which

bears his name, which regards the sun, not the earth, as the center of the planetary orbits. Now Copernicus tells us in his own writing that he derived this idea directly from the Greeks; it was in fact known to them as the Pythagorean theory, and, though not commonly believed in ancient times, it had been distinctly upheld by several Greek philosophers. It is true that the ancients had not strictly proved this theory, but then Copernicus did not either, though no doubt he argued in favor of it. Proctor says that it may be greatly doubted whether Copernicus rendered services to astronomy which were commensurate with his great fame. He left it to his successors and in particular to Kepler and Galileo to dispose finally of the geocentric theory, which everyone knows had held its ground unquestioned throughout mediaeval times. What Copernicus himself had done was to bring before the minds of men, and to familiarize them with a theory which the Greeks really originated, and for which we ought to allow them their full degree of credit.

In like manner the Greeks were great anatomists, though perhaps Aristotle, in spite of his clear insight into many physical as well as philosophical problems, may have set back Greek medical science in regard to the relative importance of the brain and the heart. But the Greek knowledge of surgery and medicine was really very advanced. Hippocrates, who lived in the Periclean era, was eminently practical; he certainly knew of the circulation of the blood. What Harvey did was merely to make it certain by completing the proof of it. Moreover, it is no exaggeration to say that Hippocrates gave a form and substance to medical science which it has never lost. Many of his views were of course wrong and have been since rejected; but that is the common part of all human speculation, and after all the Greeks were but human.

I cannot pursue this subject in detail, but I would warmly commend the history of Greek scientific discovery to the members of this Association and to all who are desirous of reconstituting modern Greek study on a satisfactory basis, and of securing its due appeal to the practical thought of our own generation.

About mathematical science I will say one word. Its very name tells us a great deal. *Mathema* means properly "learning," and the

word reminds us that this was *par excellence* the Greek study. Plato was quite eminent as a mathematician; he had written over his Academy, *μηδὲὶς ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω* and there can be little doubt that his capacity for this study had been quickened by his intercourse with the Pythagorean philosophers to whom he owed in part also his theory of ideals. Pythagoras had seen in the proportions of beauty and in the arithmetic relations of musical tones reason to suspect that all things could be explained by numbers; and Plato found this theory congenial. The extraordinary advances made by Greek thinkers in geometry and astronomy constitutes most interesting history; besides, their mathematical science has stood the test of time to a far greater extent than their merely physical theories of the universe. It follows from these few facts that the Greeks were as great in science as they were in all other lines of human endeavor, including their achievement in art and literature. And how can we account for the desire of modern scientific men to rid themselves and all future generations of what they think are the shackles of classical and especially of Greek education? Are we really to believe that they are wholly indifferent to the early history of science, to its relation to other kinds of human achievement, to the wondrous way in which the human spirit has triumphed over space and time and all the obstacles presented to it by the inert matter of this universe?

This is what I meant when I drew attention to the humanistic aspect of science. No true educator can be wholly indifferent to anything human; human science, if not the highest thing in human life, yet certainly cannot be left out of the count as unimportant. The real truth perhaps is that these modern scientists who show such a lofty contempt for the achievements of their Greek forebears, whether in art, literature, philosophy, or science, are under the impression that our classical discipline is unpractical and out of date.

Ladies and gentlemen, it is not for me now to argue this question further. I will even exhort you not at all to argue the question whether the classics are out of date. It is our business in a classical association, not to argue about our faith, but to see how we can prove it to our pupils, prove it to their parents, prove it to the world at large. I hope that you will not think I have wasted a glorious

opportunity tonight because I have left little time to discuss what is directly practical or methodical in regard to classical education. I have already said that I came to America not to teach so much as to learn from you the best methods of vitalizing our subject and proving to our critics, whether friendly or the reverse, that we are not unpractical and that we are not out of date.

Nevertheless I will offer a few suggestions by laying down some definite principles as to method in classical teaching—principles which may be in themselves fairly obvious but which it may be you will like to hear distinctly enunciated in due order.

1. We must always try to combine breadth of view with accuracy. By breadth of view I mean a regard for large aspects of our subject. We must remember *the whole is greater than the part*. Classical study, as humanism views it, is the study of antiquity—not all antiquity, but such as regards our own origins, the forces which molded our civilization in its earlier stages.

The weakness, I might say the vice, of one sort of classical scholarship was that it allowed itself to become so interested and absorbed in certain aspects of literary study, that it neglected to ascertain the real relations and the real values of those matters of detail. There is here, I take it, some opposition between the methods of research and the methods of teaching. Research, to be successful, must be limited in its scope; the more limited it is, the more likely it is to succeed. Hence we see how enormous is the specialization prevailing in modern research—whether in science, history, or archaeology. Division of labor is the very soul of research (though even here there must be a higher co-ordination of many distinct lines of lower investigation). But in education, specialization is at least a danger. We must train our own minds and the minds of our students to regard matters of study in their true and vital relationship to the history of the human spirit. I hope I shall not be misunderstood in calling this spirit a psychological attitude of mind. I mean that we must value history, literature, poetry, drama, art, refinement of taste, and all humanism, chiefly as a function of that spiritual totality which we call mankind. Viewed in this light everything is of importance—even grammar and prosody become instinct with vital interest—whereas

apart from human psychology everything becomes tame and insipid, all is bitterness and affliction of spirit.

2. If our aim is to be thus psychological, our methods must be equally so. Hence we shall recognize the enormous importance of appealing to the senses of our students. We shall exhaust ourselves in the effort to bring home to them, by the sight of their eyes and by the appeal to their tactile sense, the facts of ancient life. We shall bring them immediately into the atmosphere of reality and we shall make an impression upon their mind by bringing before them real and tangible evidence of the true facts concerning ancient life. This is the appeal to archaeology. I have already been told by an authority in classical education in this country that there is if anything a tendency in America to overemphasize the use of archaeological aids to teaching. There can be no such overemphasis if archaeology is utilized in the right way and in the true spirit of enlightened humanism. But this brings me to my third point.

3. The use of archaeology in classical teaching is always subordinate to the psychological aim, i.e., it is never regarded as an end in itself but always strictly as a means to that end. Of all the false notions which I have observed in discussions on classical teaching none of them is so ridiculous as the idea that we, the reforming school, desire to substitute a smattering of archaeology for a more solid kind of classical training. I do not of course refer to the vagaries of exceptional individuals who may chance to be weak-minded and under-instructed enthusiasts. But I speak for the movement toward reform in its saner aspects—as I have tried to promote it, and shall continue to do to the best of my power. We reformers consider that it is a crime as well as a blunder on the part of classical teachers to neglect the opportunities provided by modern archaeological research for illuminating our subject and bringing it home to the minds and senses of our students. It is all very well to sneer at the cinematograph as something unspeakably degrading to modern society. But I know very well that if I wanted to learn how some action was really carried on I should rather see a cinematograph record than read an account of it by the most vivid of chroniclers. The Roman poet Lucretius under-

stood this principle very well: *Segnius irritant animos dimissa per aurem quam quae sint oculis subiecta fidelibus!* We cannot, I suppose, in our branch of study utilize the cinematograph, though I for one should not hesitate to do so were it in any way feasible. But to show our students good photographs of the countries, the buildings, the art, and the antiquities of the ancients; to place at their disposal originals or facsimiles of the coins, of the pottery, and the other art-products of the ancients as they are being unearthed by the modern excavator; to give them a clear vision of the great prehistoric fortresses and palaces of Gnosso, Troy, Tiryns, Mycenae, and Pylos, with the art and architecture of Greece and Rome as preserved at Olympia, Delphi, Paestum, Pompeii, and above all on the Acropolis of Athens and in the Roman Forum; in a word, to familiarize them with the realities of ancient life instead of confining their attention to mere ideas or mere names of things—this is not a council of perfection, but to neglect it is to leave out of our work something of real and vital importance; it is to be guilty of a sin of omission for which no efforts in other directions could wholly atone!

These principles, ladies and gentlemen, must be so obvious to the members of your association that I should almost apologize for enunciating them. But though you do much, you can perhaps do more; or you can at least renew your adhesion to the principles which I have suggested, if provided always that they commend themselves to your minds, as I feel little doubt they will, and while we realize the necessity of revising our methods and keeping them fully abreast of all that is good and wholesome in modern educational science, we shall do well to remind ourselves that there is also something deeper than method—something more far-reaching.

My word to the Classical Association of the Middle West and South is this: Take care of your ideals and the methods will take care of themselves. The Greeks were great because they had great ideals. In our educational endeavors, if our ideals are high the education we impart will be correspondingly high and our critics we may then leave securely alone.